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Abstract  
The unprecedented and recurrent closure of much of UK and northern European 
airspace from 14 April 2010, following the eruption of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano, caused the cancellation of 108,000 flights, disrupted the travel plans of 10.5 
million passengers, and cost the airline industry in excess of $1.7bn in lost revenue 
(Eurocontrol, 2010). The airspace closures highlighted the inherent riskiness of 
aviation and destabilised dominant cultural discourses of the ‘superiority’ and 
capability of aviation technology. It also brought issues of risk acceptability and our 
socio-economic reliance on air travel into sharp relief. This paper explores how the 
political and media framing of the response to the airspace closures as a human 
‘policy fiasco’ served to obfuscate the inherent dangers of aviation and ‘get Europe 
flying’ again. Thus, this paper contends that this particular fiasco was ‘necessary’ in 
that it served to highlight the fragility of air travel and the vulnerabilities of the 
mobile citizen.  
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Introduction  
On the morning of 14 April 2010, following three weeks of moderate volcanic 
activity, the main chamber of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted. The main 
eruption released into the atmosphere 750 tonnes of volcanic material every second 
and sent a plume of volcanic ash and debris over 30,000ft into the sky. This plume 
contained both large ejecta, which rapidly fell to earth, and billions of tiny fragments 
of sharp volcanic glass and ash, many less than a micron in diameter. The volcano’s 
location, an unusually stable jetstream, and anticyclones over the north Atlantic 
rapidly blew the ash cloud south and east towards mainland Europe and some of the 
world’s busiest airspace.  
 
The sudden presence of highly abrasive volcanic ash in the skies above northern 
Europe prompted European Aviation Authorities to take the unprecedented decision 
to progressively close sectors of European airspace as a precautionary measure to 
protect public safety. Scottish and Norwegian sectors were the first to be regulated on 
the evening of April 14th. However, as the plume spread south and east, further 
restrictions were introduced for Irish, Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish airspace. 
Additional sectors of sky over mainland Europe were then closed during April 16 and 
17, grounding hundreds of flights and disrupting the travel plans of tens of thousands 
of passengers. By 18 April, airspace and airports from Ireland to Ukraine, and 
Norway to the Canary Islands, were effectively closed and less than a fifth of 
scheduled flights were able to operate (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Eyjafjallajökull’s effects on European air traffic, 12-25 April 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Based on Eurocontrol (2010: 1) figures 
 
On the ground, confusion reigned. No one knew which sectors of sky might be closed, 
when, or the length of time they would remain shut. Some passengers were 
accommodated in airport hotels or slept in terminals awaiting news, while others 
abandoned their immediate travel plans and either returned home or had an 
unexpected extended vacation. Perishable goods, normally air-freighted into Europe, 
were left to rot in warehouses overseas and, as the disruption ran into its fourth day, 
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UK newspapers ominously reported that supermarket stocks of fresh fruit and 
vegetables were running low (Roberts 2010).  
 
By 18 April, many passengers and airlines were becoming increasingly frustrated at 
what they perceived to be a lack of urgency by regulators to ‘get Europe moving’ and 
questioned whether the restrictions were proportionate to the risk the ash posed. The 
fundamental problem was an absence of data detailing ash tolerance combined with a 
lack of consensus among airframe and engine manufacturers, airlines, international 
safety regulators, and aerospace engineers as to what constituted a ‘safe’ 
concentration of atmospheric ash. While some maintained that the presence of any 
volcanic ash represented an unacceptable risk to flight safety, others contended that 
the airspace shutdown was an over-reaction and that ‘clear’ corridors could be found 
through the ash. With financial losses mounting, major airlines, including Lufthansa, 
KLM, and British Airways, performed a series of test flights to determine the effects 
of ash on aircraft handling and engine performance (Brown 2010). As a result, a new 
threshold of 2000 micrograms of ash (0.002g) per cubic metre of air was accepted and 
European airspace was progressively reopened from April 20th until further volcanic 
activity and strengthening winds necessitated further closures in early May (Calleja-
Crespo, 2010). 
 
Overall, this unprecedented and recurrent closure of much of UK and northern 
European airspace from 14 April 2010 caused the cancellation of 108,000 flights, 
disrupted the travel plans of 10.5 million passengers, and cost the airline industry in 
excess of $1.7bn in lost revenue (Eurocontrol, 2010). However, such primarily 
economic evaluations of the closure of European airspace tell us little of how the 
volcanic eruption and the events surrounding it challenged the contemporary cultural 
politics of aviation and air safety. This paper seeks to supplement such narrow 
evaluations, suggesting that the airspace closures highlight the inherent ‘riskiness’ of 
aviation and destabilise dominant cultural discourses of the ‘superiority’ and 
capability of aviation technology. The closures brought firmly into the public domain 
issues of risk acceptability and our socio-economic ‘reliance’ on air travel. Indeed, the 
paper explores how in the UK the political and media framing of the response to the 
airspace closures as a human ‘policy fiasco’ served to obfuscate the inherent dangers 
of aviation and ‘get Europe flying’ again.  
 
European airspace: making the ‘invisible’ visible 
While Eyjafjallajökull was not the first volcanic eruption to endanger aircraft and 
disrupt air traffic (see Casadevall, 1994a, 1994b; Cantor 1998; Hufford et al. 2000; 
Simpson et al 2002; Guffanti et al 2005; Owen 2006; Prata and Tupper, 2009), both 
its short-term socio-economic effects and longer-term regulatory implications were 
profound. On an average weekday, 25,000-28,500 commercial flights, plus many 
thousands more military and private aircraft, use European airspace. For the most 
part, they are protected from collision by the skill and vigilance of flightcrew and air 
traffic controllers, increasingly sophisticated collision avoidance software, and strict 
adherence to international aeronautical regulations that stipulate how and where 
different air traffic may fly. Ordinarily, the complex, largely invisible, aerial 
infrastructure of flightpaths, control zones, and airways which facilitates this routine 
aeromobility, is taken-for granted and the only time passengers hear about airspace is 
when flights are delayed, diverted, or cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions, 
computer failure, terrorist activity, or industrial action. As Eyjafjallajökull 
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demonstrated, airspaces matter to the production of aeromobilities because air travel 
cannot function without them. 
 
The development of commercial passenger flight in the 20th century demanded the 
extension of traditional Cartesian understandings of territory to embrace the aerial 
dimension, and this, in turn, necessitated the formation of new transnational forms of 
airspace regulation and governance. Aviation forced an awareness of the ‘depth’ or 
‘height’ of the sky and airspace was increasingly delimited, controlled, and inscribed 
with numerous interlocking military, commercial, and political strata (see Budd 
2009). Today, the routine production of European airspace is a complex, spatially 
distributed, and time-critical activity concerned with facilitating safe airborne 
transportation. To maintain safe and efficient coordination, practices of air traffic 
control and piloting are heavily regulated by internationally agreed procedures and are 
supported by a number of technologies that mediate the production of airspace and 
create safe and ‘useable’ spaces for aerial mobility. However, so attuned has western 
society become to these spaces of mobility that the spaces of aerial flow are rarely the 
subject of academic scrutiny. Certainly, as Budd (2009) and Williams (2010) have 
shown, the implicit positioning of airspace in much of the extant literature on air 
travel and aeromobility as mere ‘conduits’ or ‘spaces of air traffic flows’ negates 
serious considerations of the everyday socio-spatial practices that work to (re)produce 
them.  
 
Taking inspiration from the seminal work of Castells (1996), Dodge and Kitchin 
(2004) explored how the production of specialist computer software, ‘code’, mediates 
the production of different ‘code/spaces’ of aviation. These spaces, they concluded, 
are not only produced by code but are also utterly reliant on code to function. In the 
context of air travel, Budd and Adey (2009) have similarly commented on the digital 
technicity of aviation and remarked on the extent to which code mediates the 
production of airspace and makes it ‘visible’ and known to pilots. This activity of 
‘producing airspace’ is accomplished through a heterogeneous collection of situated 
and coordinated actions involving a variety of different technologies and human 
actors.  
 
The fiasco  
Within days of the closure of European airspace, and amidst reports that the UK 
emergency planning committee was to be convened, the then UK Prime Minister, 
Gordon Brown, instructed senior Cabinet ministers, who were then engaged on the 
general election campaign, to implement plans for ending the ‘temporary exile’ of 
some 200,000 British citizens stranded abroad (The Guardian, 19 April 2010). Raising 
the spectre of the evacuation of Dunkirk during the Second World War (The 
Independent, 19 April 2010), it was subsequently announced that the Royal Navy, 
cruise ships and commercial shipping would be deployed to repatriate British citizens. 
Indeed, Lord Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
made the emotional appeal to the media that all options were under consideration for 
‘getting our people back home’ (The Guardian, 18 April 2010).  
 
The fact that the closure of European airspace was quickly articulated as a ‘crisis’ 
owed much to the strategic contribution of air transportation to capital accumulation 
in the contemporary post-Fordist economy. Over the last thirty years, but in particular 
following the deregulation of European aviation in the 1990s and growth of low-cost 
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budget carriers that ensued, there has been a huge expansion in the consumption of air 
travel. In the UK alone, passenger numbers increased five-fold during the last 30 
years to the point where half the population flies at least once every 12 months and as 
many as 600 million passengers could be using UK airports annually by 2030 (DfT 
2003). This dramatic expansion has been, in part, the product of sustained state 
support of the aviation industry which, within government circles at least, has been 
seen repeatedly as a key component of Britain’s global economic competitiveness 
(see, for example, the rhetoric of New Labour’s 2003 White Paper The Future of Air 
Transport). However, as with the promotion of the automobile and road transport, 
such expansion cannot be divorced from the cultural production of ‘particular types of 
individuals attuned to constant mobility’ (see Paterson’s study of ‘car culture’, 2007: 
91). The post-war expansionist regime of air travel has been predicated upon the 
articulation of fantasmatic ‘jet-set’ narratives, which have operated to prevent and 
displace the construction of antagonisms (Griggs and Howarth, 2011 forthcoming). 
These fantasmatic narratives, as the analysis of Randles and Mander (2009a; 2009b) 
suggests, have contributed to the ‘normalisation’ of air travel such that flying has 
become an ‘ordinary’ component of our daily lives, our celebrations and family 
events, and our professional and economic activities.  
 
As events unfolded, these discursive constructions of air transport increasingly 
surfaced through media ‘vignettes’ which recounted stories of individual travellers 
‘stranded’ abroad. Only a few days after the eruption, the national tabloid newspaper 
The Sun (16 April 2010) featured the story of bride-to-be Kelly who had to call off her 
dream wedding in Antigua whilst presenting images of holidaymakers and 
businesspeople ‘racing’ off to buy bicycles in order to qualify for the last remaining 
tickets reserved for cyclists on cross-Channel ferries. The national tabloid also 
reported the somewhat comical image of ‘City workers thumbing lifts from truckers’. 
Such images resonated with the interventions of a coalition of pro-aviation 
stakeholders who communicated, via the media, details of the economic losses and 
threats posed by the closure of UK airspace, both to our national airlines and airports 
and to our wider industrial and service sectors. The chair of the Airport Operators 
Association, Ed Anderson, conjuring up the metaphor of a Britain ‘closed for 
business’, claimed that ‘the cost of ongoing disruption for the airlines and airports 
industry alone is £130m a day. Add to that the cost to businesses dependent on flights 
to move goods and people and the effect on the wider economy is critical’ (The 
Guardian, 20 April 2010).  
 
Faced with such dislocatory threats to individual mobility and economic performance, 
the closure of European airspace (and the ensuing travel disruption) was quickly 
articulated as a failure of government leadership or bureaucratic decision-making, in 
particular the collective failures of NATS (National Air Traffic Services), the Civil 
Aviation Authority and the Met Office. The Sun newspaper, in its edition of 16 April 
(see above), reproduced claims that the closure of airspace was a ‘massive over-
reaction’, citing doubts from a marketing company, the Centre for Asia Pacific 
Aviation, that the closure of UK airspace was the result of ‘super-cautious politicians 
and bureaucrats who are far more concerned about their own liability - while suffering 
none of the financial carnage that this will cause the airlines and their feeding chain?’ 
The then leader of the Conservative Opposition, David Cameron, attacked the 
‘muddle and confusion in government’, and called for ‘a rapid inquiry to get to the 
bottom of decisions that have been taken’ (The Guardian, 21 April 2010). Airlines too 
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came under attack, with condemnations of the legacy of industry protectionism and 
poor regulation which had prevented the setting of appropriate levels of dust in the 
atmosphere for fears of ‘damage to their reputation and finances’ and ‘a fear of legal 
actions arising from the deaths of all those who had been on board’ if a plane was lost 
after an all-clear (The Guardian, 21 April 2010). Although of course, at the height of 
the crisis, with the financial stability of airlines allegedly at risk, it was airlines 
themselves who were putting pressure on regulators to set a safe level of volcanic ash 
in the atmosphere.  
 
The Mail on Sunday newspaper in its 25 April edition published a special report (Rose 
et al 2010) that characterised the government response as a ‘shambles’. Under the 
headline ‘the ash cloud that never was’, its authors doubted the extent of the crisis, 
arguing that the closure of airspace had ‘cost the airlines £1.3 billion and left 150,000 
Britons stranded - all for a supposed volcanic ash cloud that for most of the five-day 
flights ban was so thin it was invisible.’ The report also condemned a series of errors 
by government and agencies, including the unserviceability of the main aircraft used 
by the Met Office because it was to be repainted, the failings of allegedly advanced 
computer models, the following of national policies that were out of step with other 
countries where ‘flight is affected by volcanoes, such as the United States’, and 
ultimately the failure of government to trust the professional judgment of pilots 
themselves. In a similar vein, Richard North, writing in the same edition, concluded 
that ‘it wasn't volcanic ash that brought the air industry to its knees but decades of 
neglect, underfunding, poor planning and layers of bureaucracy behind the 
Government and Europe-wide response.’  Most importantly, he sought to situate the 
‘crisis’ within the realm of the politics and policy-making, arguing that ‘the disaster 
may have been natural, but the mishandling was wholly man-made’ (The Mail on 
Sunday, 25 April 2010). Indeed, its sister paper, the Daily Mail (18 May 2010) was 
later to publish, alongside an investigation by David Derbyshire into the closure of 
European airspace entitled ‘So how did they get it so wrong?’  
 
Faced with such charges, the Brown Government repeatedly sought to frame the 
closure of airspace as an issue of passenger safety. Brown himself argued that the 
government would ‘never be forgiven if we had let planes fly and there was a real 
danger to passengers' lives’ (The Guardian, 21 April 2010).  The head of the Civil 
Aviation Authoritywas at pains to point out that the government had put no political 
pressure on the Authority during the crisis.  In his defence of the decision to re-open 
British airspace, he even added: ‘I would happily fly myself’ (The Guardian, 21 April 
2010). Such claims were designed to assuage public concerns over what constituted 
‘safe’ concentrations of atmospheric ash. The day before the airspace was reopened, 
the president of the European Cockpit Association claimed that he did not ‘think there 
is a definitive answer to whether it is safe or not …’ (The Guardian 20 April 2010). 
Yet, even when arguing in support of passenger safety, the Brown government came 
under attack. Notably, Max Hastings writing in The Daily Mail used passenger safety 
to berate the overbearing health and safety ‘culture’ across society, questioning 
society’s poor understanding of risk and the ‘assumption that increasing public safety 
is an absolute good.’  Echoing charges of over-reaction, Hastings concluded that the 
‘great volcanic ash air shutdown is part of the price we pay for this [culture]. Until, as 
a society, we learn to measure risk realistically, we shall continue to face draconian 
responses to even marginal threats’ (23 April 2010). 
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With the accumulation of such media interventions, the unpredictability and ‘natural’ 
origins of the volcanic eruption were very quickly dismissed in favour of the 
construction of the event as a policy fiasco. Drawing upon the work of Bovens and ‘t 
Hart, policy fiascos are widely understood as ‘a negative event, that is perceived by a 
socially and politically significant group of people in the community to be at least 
partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public policymakers’ 
(Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996: 15; Gray and ‘t Hart, 1998: 8-9).  Against this background, 
what we see in the response by the media to the closure of the European airspace is 
repeated attempts to construct the series of events surrounding the volcanic eruption 
as the ‘avoidable and blameworthy failures’ of government and bureaucratic decision-
makers. Thus the charges of incompetence that were levelled at NATS and the Met 
Office cannot be divorced from argumentative strategies designed to identify events 
as ‘negative’, to claim that human intervention could have made a difference to how 
events unfolded, and to allocate blame - all stages in the construction of an incident as 
a policy fiasco. In other words, the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull is re-inscribed over 
time in a causal narrative (c.f. Stone, 1989) that reframed the volcanic eruption as a 
‘policy problem’ with its origins in human error; thereby shifting attention from the 
contingency of the eruption to the failed management of European airspace which 
might be addressed by better planning and human agency.  
 
Surfacing the cultural politics of aviation 
It is tempting to reduce this construction of the events surrounding the Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption to no more than the outcome of the instrumental calculations of politicians 
fighting an election or newspaper editors looking to sell copy. However, such 
interpretations say little of how the eruption and the closure of European airspace 
came to challenge the symbolic underpinnings and embedded social and political 
discourses of air travel. As we suggest above, the volcanic ash cloud challenged 
society’s widely-held cultural perceptions of air travel as a safe and normal activity. 
Stories of threatened supplies of fruit and vegetables, experiences of missed weddings 
and stranded passengers dislocated public conceptions of human beings as ‘mobile 
subjects’ in ‘mobile economies’. Newspapers regaled the strategies of stranded 
passengers, including those of celebrities such as the actor John Cleese who allegedly 
paid £3,300 to hire a taxi to undertake a one thousand mile trip from Oslo to Brussels 
when his flight was cancelled due to volcanic dust (Jamieson 2010).  
 
Of course, such experiences, and their reporting, did not automatically threaten to 
destabilise the regime of aviation expansion that has characterised the post-war 
development of air transport. On the one hand, they illuminated our taken-for-granted 
dependency on air travel and our apparent ‘need’ for air travel. Yet, on the other hand, 
they offered the possibility of a life ‘without’ air travel. Environmentalists and 
newspaper columnists were quick to point out the unusually quiet skies and the 
benefits of the airspace closure in the fight against global warming (Walsh 2010). 
Stuart Jeffries, writing in The Guardian, commented on the delights of walking in 
Syon Park, West London, during the flight free days which allowed him to ‘savour the 
birdsong [and other]…restful sounds, so long obliterated by Virgin Atlantics laden 
with victims of global Disneyfication and Lufthansas packed with businessmen [sic] 
who could just as well conduct their fatuous meetings via Skype from Munich’ (2010: 
9). 
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Most importantly, the eruption and the dust cloud challenged our supremacy of the 
skies, making visible the inherent riskiness of air travel and the fragility of scientific 
discourses of human control over nature. The advent of heavier-than-air powered 
flight at the beginning of the twentieth century transformed patterns and practices of 
human mobility. Aircraft have rapidly come to represent freedom, escape, and 
emancipation from the confines of an otherwise terrestrial existence and embodied 
notions of twentieth and twenty-first century modernity (see Crouch 2003; Wohl 
2005). Yet, in addition to being a source of cultural inspiration, aviation has also 
provoked unease and anxiety. Many maintained that flight was a highly artificial and 
unremittingly dangerous activity and, in order to reassure potential passengers that 
aircraft were safe, airlines invested heavily in staff training and new technology. 
Throughout the twentieth century, increasingly sophisticated aeronautical 
technologies co-evolved alongside cultures of aeronautical safety to minimise known 
potential risks and make air travel statistically one of the safest forms of 
transportation. Yet, in the words of John Urry (2009: 28) flight remains ‘risky for 
those flying, for those organising and managing those flights, and for those on the 
ground as viewers or innocent bystanders’.  
 
An awareness of the inherent ‘riskiness’ of air travel is apparent in much of the 
emerging literature on ‘aeromobility’ (on which see Adey et al 2007; Adey 2010), 
with recent discussions identifying the threat posed by terrorism, human failings, and 
emerging infectious diseases. This paper has sought to build on these literatures by 
suggesting how a natural geological process, or ‘act of God’, rendered otherwise 
highly sophisticated aircraft impotent and called into question the illusion of human 
technological achievement and infallibility. While nervous flyers have long remarked 
on the seeming impossibility of aviation and wondered how something so big and so 
heavy can leave the ground and fly for thousands of miles with seemingly no means 
of support, the ash plume caused others to ask how a multi-million pound engine, 
complete with the latest electronic management systems, could be incapacitated by 
tiny fragments of ash. The ash cloud thus did more than merely disrupt air traffic for a 
few days, it causes us to confront the limits of our technological capacity and re-
evaluate the extent to which we have really ‘conquered’ the air.  
 
Conclusions: a ‘necessary’ fiasco? 
That the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull brought chaos to air travel across Europe, 
resulting in billions of dollars of lost income and travel disruption and personal 
hardship for thousands of passengers is not contested. Yet, the construction of 
European airspace as a policy fiasco says much about the politics of air travel and our 
understandings of mobility in contemporary societies. Policy fiascos are often 
characterised as moments of dislocation in which the limits of established policy 
routines and ‘normal politics’ are made visible. However, in this particular conjecture, 
the labelling of the events surrounding the eruption, and specifically the response of 
government, as a policy fiasco played a more nuanced role. Here, we suggest, it 
served to offset the potential dislocation to our underlying assumptions of the utility 
of ‘mobile subjects’ and our normalised reliance on aviation, in particular our 
displacement of the risks attached to air travel. In fact, this particular articulation of a 
policy fiasco characterised the closure of airspace, which it re-defined as the ‘real 
problem’ facing government, as the fault of politicians and bureaucrats and a result of 
repeated mis-management by individuals. It thereby distanced the contingency of the 
‘natural’ eruption and fears over safety from the alleged incompetence of the policy 
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response, dividing the crisis of air travel into two sets of disentangled events so as to 
privilege that which was manageable through the allocation of blame and causality to 
agents. In so doing, it negated attempts to frame the eruption in terms of safety, our 
over-dependency on aviation and mobility, or the impact of aviation on climate 
change, bringing to our attention the often unrecognised capacity of narratives of 
fiasco to suture potential dislocations. Against this background, we conclude that the 
fiasco of the closure of European airspace was a ‘necessary’ fiasco that served to 
mask the fragility of air travel and the ‘mobile citizen’.  
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